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United States v. Segers
271 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2001)
L Faas

A jury convicted James Calvin Segers ("Segers") on October 3, 1996, of
conspiracyto possess cocaine with intent to distribute and of attempt to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Crcuit affirmed Segers' conviction on July20, 1998. Segers then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was denied
on November 16, 1998. The Supreme Court also denied Segers' petition for
rehearing of the denial of certiorari on January25, 1999.'
On January 20, 2000, Segers filed a pro se motion for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C S2255.2 The government moved to dismiss this motion
as untimely pursuant to the one-year period of limitation stated in S2255.' The
United States District Court for the Mddle District of North Carolina agreed
with the government and dismissed Segers' motion as untimely, stating that
Segers
had filed his motion more than one )ear after his conviction became
final 4
II. Hddig
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Crcuit affimed the
district court's dismissal of Segers' S2255 motion.5 The Fourth Crcuit agreed
that the one-year period of limitation established in S 2255 began when the
Supreme Court made Segers' conviction final by denying his petition for a writ
of certiorari, rather than when it denied his petition for rehearing.'
III AndIsis
Segers contended that the "date on which [his) conviction bec[ame] final"
was the date on which the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for

1. United States v. Segers, 271 F.3d 181, 183 (4th CAr. 2001).
2. 1d; seeabo28 US.C S 2255 (Supp. V 1999) ("A 1-)ear period of limitation shall applyto
a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of - (1) the date on
which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
.....
3. Sies, 271 F.3d at 183.
4. Id
5. Id
6. Id at 182-83.
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rehearing of the denial of certiorari7 Segers asserted that because this date was

less than one year before he filed his S2255 motion, his motion should not have
been dismissed as untimely. The Fourth Circuit, pursuant to Unite State v
P/ait, reviewed the district court's denial of Segers' motion de novo.'
The Government asserted that, under Supreme Court Rule 16.3, the Supreme Court's order of denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari is not "suspended pending disposition of a petition for rehearing." Therefore, Segers'
petition for rehearing had no effect on the finality of his conviction. This made
the Supreme Court's denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari the "final
disposition of his case.""2 The Fourth Circuit looked at the decisions of the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Tenth, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh
Qrcuits, which had all held that a defendant's conviction becomes final when the
Supreme Court denies her petition for a writ of certiorari." Following these
authorities, the Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme Court finalized Segers'
conviction on November 16,1998, when the Court denied his petition for a writ
of certiorari 4 Thus, Segers' 52255 motion, which was filed more than one year
later, on January 20, 2000, was untimely."

7. SVs, 271 F3d at 182; se 28 US.C S 2255 (Supp. V 1999).
8. SqWs, 271 F.3d at 182.
9. 221 F.3d 686 (4th CAr. 2000).
10. $qn,271 F3d at 183; United States v. Prescott, 221 F.3d 686, 687 (4th Car. 2000)
(stating that when the defendant raises a question of law, the circuit court's review is plenary.
11.
S s, 271 F.3d at 184; swaso SUP. Cr. K 16.3. The rule states:

[W]henever the Court denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, the (Jerk will prepare,
sgn, and enter an order to that .ffect and will notify forthwith counsel of record and

the court whose judgment was sought to be reviewid. The order of denial will not be

suspended penng disposition of a petition for rehearing except byorder of the Court
or a justice.
Id
12.
13.

Sis, 271 F.3d at 184.
1d at 185-86;swasoUnited States v. W'llis, 202 F.3d 1279,1280 (10th Cr.2000) (holding

that, for purposes of S 2255, a conviction becomes final once the Supreme Court denies petition
for certiorari, regardless of whether the defendant files a petition for rehearing); United States v.
Thomas, 203 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cr. 2000) (holding that the defendants' convictions became final
on the date upon which the Supreme Court denied their petitions for certiorar); Horton v. United
States, 244 F3d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that defendant's conviction became final after the

Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari, because after this point, no further action was
required to dispose of defendant's appea4; Washington v. United States, 243 F3d 1299, 1300-01
(IIth Cr. 2001) (holding that the S 2255 one-ear limitation period began on the day the Supreme

Court denied defendant's petition for certiorar).
14.
15.

Sirs,271 F.3d at 186.
Id at 182-83.
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UNITED STATES V SEGERS
IV. Appliazm in Vz gzm

While S 2255(1) is applicable to collateral review of federal court convictions, 28 U.S.C S2254 isapplicable to collateral review of state court decisions. 6
Title 28 U.S.C S2263(a), which procedurallycontrols S2254 petitions for habeas
corpus in capital cases, states that "[alnyapplication under this chapter for habeas
corpus relief under S2254 must be filed in the appropriate district court not later
than 180 days after final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence
on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review."17 In
Virginia, the state supreme court automatically reviews all cases in which the
defendant is sentenced to death, whether or not the defendant appeals her
sentence.' 8 Thus, the issue of whether the defendant filed her habeas petition
within 180 days after "time for seeking [final state court] review" expired will
never arise.19 However, if the Supreme Court of Virginia affirms the defendant's
conviction and death sentence, she must take care to file her petition for habeas
corpus relief within the 180-dayperiod of limitation." Under S2263(b)(1), this
limitation period is tolled:
[F]rom the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the Supreme
Court until the date of inal disposition of the petition if a State prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme Court of the
affirmance of a capital sentence on direct reviewby the court of last
resort of the State or other final State court decision on direct review.
21

Although this language is not identical to the language in S2255, it is likelythat
the Fourth CGrcuit would find that "the date of final disposition of the petition"
is the date on which the Supreme Court denies a defendant's petition for a writ
of certiorari or the date on which the defendant's time to file this petition
expires.22 It is of no consequence that the defendant has twenty-five days after
denial of her petition for a writ of certiorari to petition for rehearing. The 180day limitation period in capital cases istolled only betwn the date on which the
defendant files a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court and the

16. Sw28 US.C S 2255 (Supp. V 1999); seeao28 US.C 2254 (Supp. V 1999).
17. 28 US.C S 2263(a) (Supp. V 1999).
18. VA. QJDE ANN. 5 17.1-313 (Michie 1999); sm eg, Patterson v. Commonwealh, 551
S.E.2d 332,335 (Va. 2001) (staring that statutorily mandated review bySupreme Court of Virginia

maynot be waived bydefendant); Zirkie v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 601 (Va. 2001) (stating that,
even where defendant had instructed his counsel not to pamdcipate in anyappeals on his behalf, the
Supreme Court of Vagini was still required by statute to review the imposition of the death
sentence).

19.
20.

S2263(a).
Id

21.

S 2263(b)(1).

22.

Id

418
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date on which the Supreme Court denies this original petition for a writ of
certiorari.23
Mythri A. Jayaraman

23. SeeS 2263(a). See also S 2244(d)(1), which controls S 2254 petitions for habeas corpus
in non-capital cases. Section 2244(d)(1) states that:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus
by a person in cus
pursuant to ie
nt of a State court. The limitation
period shall run from tel latest of - (A) he te on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the tame for seeking such
review...
S2254(d)(1).
Again, t is ely that the Fourth Cicuit would find that "the date on which the judgment became
final" is the date on which the Supreme Court denies adefendant's petition for a writ of certiorari
or the date on which the defendant's time to file this petition expires, thus beginning the 1-year
period of limitation. Id

